Opening remarks
forward. For some the importance of this project has existential proportions, as its failure is thought to jeopardize the future of European integration as a whole.
Indeed, the realization is creeping in that the trusted method of achieving progress in the integration process faces an uncertain future. Doubts about the stability of the European Union are raised. Much seems thus at stake and it is little surprising that German Presidency in the Council is currently undertaking major efforts to revitalize the Constitutional Treaty while at the same time some Member States that have already implemented said Treaty put pressure on the unwilling or hesitant rest.
The recent negative referenda in France and the Netherlands, as well as the general antipathy of the citizens in other Member States towards this Treaty should not be easily dismissed as the response of ill-informed citizens that oppose the Constitutional Treaty for the wrong reasons. Indeed, the truth may be somewhat more worrisome at least for those of us who are in principle in favour of European integration.
What I will argue here today is that the current situation in Europe is to a considerable extent caused by the persisting deficit of democratic procedures that would allow and maybe even require citizens to claim ownership of European policies and decisionsmaking. Under the current system continuing European integration both in terms of geographic widening and political deepening may not be a viable future option. What is needed is a fundamental review of today's institutional framework.
I would first of all like to introduce you to the basic modus operandi that has been applied in building Europe -a method that in my view has contributed to the current situation. Thereafter I will illustrate some of the main characteristics of today's institutional structure, which form a stumbling block to a greater ownership of European citizens.
Finally, I would like to address the question how the present shortcomings could be addressed. In my view, the Constitutional Treaty does not provide a sustainable solution for the future. Instead we have to start to think outside the box by finally design an institutional framework that will at the very least no longer stand in the way of the ownership of citizens of European policies and decision-making.
Europe-Condemned to continues further integration? [Ladies and Gentlemen]
Looking back, European integration and with it the development of European law has taken place in waves. From setbacks mostly arose innovation and strength, as well as the collective will of the Member States to pick up the pieces, get back on their feet, and resume the integration process. The final aim of the European project remained largely in the dark. The preamble to the original EEC Treaty referred to the determination: "…to lay the foundations of an every closer union among the peoples of Europe…" A similar reference can be found in today's EU Treaty. The lack of a "finalité politique", a clearly defined final aim of European integration both in geographic and political terms was and until this very day still is a deliberate choice. It has been characterized as a "constructive ambiguity", which is to be preferred over an unconstructive discussion on principles.
This process-based approach has put Europe in a position where it can only be as successful as the next integration step. Walter Hallstein, a less well-known but equally influential architect of the integration process and the first president of the
Commission of the European Economic Community once famously compared
European integration with a bicycle: a continues forward momentum created by the paddling is required in order to stop the bicycle from being pushed out of balance and from eventually falling to the side.
This ratio has served on more than one occasion as an underlying argument in creating the necessary momentum to bring the political elites of the Member States together in reaching consensus over the next integration step. At least equally important, in the Member States this has formed the main argument in gaining what in most instances amounted to the passive consent of the citizens for the steady transfer of decision-making powers to the European level.
The Monnet-method describes an inner logic to European integration: the political unification of Europe was to take place by means of economic integration through the introduction of a new legal order, establishing supranational institutions.
Indeed, the process has focused on the pooling of competencies for the exercise of policy. What was discounted for a long time were the consequences for the democratic legitimation and accountability of power increasingly exercised outside the established constitutional structures of the Member States and the impact this would have on the image of European integration in the eyes of its citizens. Scharpf observes rightly that efficiency rather than democracy has been perceived to ensure legitimacy.
[Ladies and gentlemen]
Economic integration served as a "Politikersatz", i.e. as a substitute for politics. Today's institutional structure does not support the emergence of such an ownership of the citizens of the European Union.
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The penetration of the national legal order through European law complements the existing national structures by a new source of political power. Democratic legitimacy and accountability face new challenges. Rather than to refer to 'government without statehood', I would argue that these challenges are at least in part created by government above statehood.
The question where the sources of democratic legitimation and accountability should be located in such a system is anything but straightforward. The reason for this is that by its very nature as a new legal order the European Communities cannot easily be placed on a scale ranging from a federation of states to a federal state.
Europe is a half-way house. The current institutional structure of the European Union and the rules governing the exercise of power by and the relationship between these institutions clearly reflect the complexity of the European multidimensional system of governance. Indeed, the system aims at establishing an equilibrium both horizontally between the Member States and between the citizens of the Member States, as well as vertically between the national and supranational level. This may not be a problem to the extent that decisions in the Council are taken by unanimity as no decision can be taken without the consent of a Member State.
However, in the majority of cases in the Community context decisions in the Council are taken based on a complex system of allocation of voting rights to Member States, referred to as qualified-majority voting. The allocation of these voting rights is based on a system which attempts to combine proportionate representation of Member
States with proportionate representation of the population of the Member States. Adding to this is the lack in many policy areas of a clear demarcation of competences between the national and supranational level. This makes it difficult not only for national parliaments but also for the citizens to assign failures.
By channelling legitimation through the Member States, the present system neither advances the identification of citizens with European decisions nor does it promote the solidarity among the citizens of the European Union. The system allows Member
States to distance themselves vis-à-vis their own citizens from decisions taken on the European level. At times this can be a rather convenient, as Europe has to take the beating for the implementation of painful but necessary reforms which national politicians like to evade. 
[Ladies and Gentlemen]
The Commission plays a crucial role in the policy formation on the European level, foremost through its almost exclusive right of initiative for Community legislation.
Moreover, the Commission exercises its own partly original and partly delegated decision-making powers.
In 
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Continuation through reorientation [Ladies and Gentlemen]
Continuing European integration in terms of widening and deepening in my vision
should not be pursued without the broad consent of the citizens of the European
Union. This not achieved by simply explain more plainly the past achievements of European integration and its advantages. Instead citizens have to be enabled to claim ownership of European policies and decision-making.
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
I started this lecture with reference to the Constitutional Treaty, which is currently very much on the agenda again. It should be remembered that Treaty is the result of a deliberative process, which aimed at making the European Union among others more democratic. Advocating the channelling of democratic legitimacy primarily through the national parliaments bears considerable risks. The biggest problem may lay in the high potential of this procedure to politicise and indeed polemize the procedure in ways, which are counterproductive for the European legislative process. It is far from certain that the opinion formation in the national parliaments will be based on the merits of the respective European drafts rather than domestic political considerations and the desire to play a more substantive role in European policy formation.
So does the Constitutional Treaty deliver ? The short answer is
Moreover, it is at least questionable whether national parliaments will actually restrict 15 themselves to the question whether the subsidiarity principle has been observed.
National parliaments may eventually have to be reminded of the limits of their competence, which will cause conflicts. With the number of Member States in the EU growing, so does the potential for opposition to European legislative activities not necessarily based on its merits.
The Constitutional Treaty also introduces an element of participatory democracy. At least one million citizens who are nationals of a significant number of Member States would be allowed to take the initiative of inviting the Commission, within the framework of its powers, to submit any appropriate proposal on matters where citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing the Constitution. The requirement of a million signatures from a significant number of Member States may prove to be too high a hurdle to give this provision any real meaning. Moreover, the proposal de jure does not constitute more than a petition to the Commission which, as the choice of the word 'invite' suggests, is under no obligation to act. Dougan rather drastically refers to this procedure "…as a glib piece of window-dressing".
All things considered it is rather astonishing that the Constitutional Treaty is widely perceived as providing the necessary institutional reforms ensuring that European integration can continue. This is certainly not the case when it comes to enhancing the democratic legitimacy and accountability of the European Union and, more closely in enhancing the ownership of citizens.
Thinking outside the box
[Ladies and gentlement]
In my opinion the Constitutional Treaty will not free national and European policy- The main obstacles is the lack of European political parties that could rise above the Member State's political sphere and could actually address electorates across boarders based on trans-national programs.
Some would argue that these European parties have not emerged due to a lack of European awareness or rather identity on parts of the electorate. However, conversely it may also be argued that such a European identity is missing precisely because of today's system based on national parties. This amounts to a chicken-or-egg debate.
What is pretty much undisputed is that the European identity is lagging behind the increasing constitutionalization of the European Union. The way out of this dilemma is to take concrete steps towards establishing both. Commissioners-designate. Moreover, in particular in the light of proposals to transfer more executive tasks onto the Commission, its accountability needs to be reinforced.
Once a European ballot is established, the creation of various
[Ladies and gentlemen]
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This emphasise on institutional arrangements is certainly not uncontested. Indeed, recently this rather more conventional approach to increasing democracy in the European Union has been challenged. It has been argued that the democratisation of Europe calls for the emergence of a European demos first, that is a common populace rather than the populace of the individual Member States. The concern that is raised in this context is that the introduction of more democratic decision-making without a European demos would deepen the crisis as "…majority tyranny of one or more demoi over others…" could emerge. The key to establishing such a European demos is believed to be the creation of substantive citizen's rights and their effective protection rather than more direct channels of democratic participation of the citizens.
It is true that such a European populace and a European public opinion is absent and that this can to some extent explain the lack of ownership of European citizens and the indifference towards Europe. I would also agree with those that argue that the rather clumsy symbolism of the type found in the name and some of the contents of the Constitutional Treaty will do little in generating such a European identity. Indeed, creating and upholding substantive rights may be a more successful path.
However, the creation of such rights can hardly take place in a vacuum. It might be the case that in the end citizens are more interested in outcome in terms of social welfare, such as high employment, economic growth and public health, rather than in the way in which these outcomes come about. And it can also be little doubt that in some of these policy areas the European Union scores comparably low.
In a recent survey on behalf of the European Commission, the fight against unemployment, the protection of social rights and ensuring economic growth were given the lowest scores in terms of performance of the European Union. On a Dutch scale from 1-10, all three scored below 5 and thus, as we say around here: ruim onvoldoende! However, if democratic institutions are on the decline at the national level, does that not actually make the establishment of such structures on the European level even more important given the reliance of today's system on the Member States ? And moreover again, who decides what these public interests are and who decides on what policies are given priority when it comes to allocating scarce public funds?
[Ladies and Gentlemen]
What becomes clear is that a process is required by which the citizen's preferences can be identified. This comes about through democratic decision-making processes, facilitated first and foremost by an institutional framework, which provides the citizens of the European Union with a higher degree of ownership over the decisions taking on the European level on their behalf.
In a recent survey on the future of Europe, participants were asked about the best way for citizens to ensure that their voice is heard in Europe. 56 % responded with 'voting in elections'. This was the winning score. It seems like that not all is lost when it Ik heb gezegd !
